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This paper conducts an empirical study of listed companies and unlisted 
companies in the 1998-2013 periods to study the effect of listing to cash holdings, using 
matching analysis and OLS multiple regression.   
Listing reduces the degree of information asymmetry faced with the company, 
thereby reducing the company's cash holdings. And listing also eases equity agency 
costs between the managers and shareholders, which also lower cash holdings. 
However, due to the introduction of new shareholders, serious agency problem of 
control led to an increase in cash holdings. On the whole, listed companies’ cash 
holding level is lower than that of unlisted companies, listing makes the company's cash 
holdings decrease, that is to say, the increase in cash holding causes by new agency cost 
of control is less than the effect brings by information asymmetry and equity agents 
conflict. 
This paper further explores the source of cash increased by new agency cost of 
control and the way to use it. It is found that compared with unlisted companies, the 
investment implemented by listed companies is significantly much less. And the cash 
accumulated is transferred by the actual controller through related transactions, which 
satisfy their personal interests. 
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Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen（1988）基于资本市场的信息不对称，以优序融



















































公司利益冲突的主要来源（Pagano and Roell, 1998）。控股股东对小股东的利益侵
占问题成为公司主要的代理问题（Shleifer and Vishny, 1992）。 
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